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I. INTRODUCTION: ANTICOMPETITIVE ZONING CHALLENGES
The concept of zoning developed from the common law nuisance
doctrine.1 The primary purpose of zoning is to organize communities so that
compatible property uses are located in appropriate areas, thus limiting
nuisances.2 Each municipality has a comprehensive plan which “does not
*J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1
BEVERLY J. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES, 40 (1961)
(ebook).
2
Id. at 45 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926) (“[W]ith
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regulate or control the particular use of property; instead, a comprehensive
plan sets goals for the development or redevelopment of a community.”3
Guided by such a plan, a municipality enacts a zoning ordinance that
geographically divides the municipality into particular use districts (i.e.
residential, commercial, industrial), with further limits within each district.4
For example, one commercial use district may allow “retail stores, hotels,
clinics, broadcasting studios, garages, and other similar uses,” while another
commercial use district might allow for other types of businesses.5 In a
municipality’s zoning ordinance, zones can also be drawn to restrict certain
categories of businesses, such as heavy commercial or adult businesses, from
specific locations.6 While an ordinance can regulate the types of businesses
in each area, it should not regulate the individual businesses themselves.7
For example, an ordinance can even prohibit a “big box retailer,” but it
cannot individually prohibit Target or Wal-Mart.8
Anticompetitive zoning challenges can arise in any industry where the
potential addition of a local competitor poses a threat to the profitability of
an existing business owner. This practice is common, especially between
supermarkets.9 For example, Supermarket A, or the developer of its future
store, seeks approval from municipal boards and various permits in order to
develop the new location. Supermarket B, a nearby grocery store, has a
financial interest in preventing Supermarket A’s project, or at least delaying
the project for as long as possible.
In some cases, a developer might discover explicit evidence that the
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly
are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect
of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities. . . In a changing world, it is
impossible that it should be otherwise.”)).
3
RONALD S. COPE, THE ZONING AND LAND USE HANDBOOK 5 (American Bar
Association, 2016).
4
Id. at 17.
5
Id. at 18.
6
Id. at 6.
7
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423, 440 (Ct. App. 2006)
(upholding City of Turlock’s Ordinance that “require[d] a [Conditional Use Permit] for the
development of certain large-scale retail stores and would prohibit ‘discount superstores,’
which are defined as retail stores of greater than 100,000 square feet that devote more than 5
percent of sales-floor area to nontaxable items such as groceries.” However, the court did not
find that “the Ordinance was enacted for the purpose of targeting Wal-Mart. The Ordinance
[did] not single out Wal-Mart but, instead, prohibit[ed] all discount superstores within [the]
City’s boundaries.”).
8
Id. at 440.
9
Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir.
2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 2451 (2016) (noting that supermarkets are an example of “an
industry notorious for low profit margins, perhaps it is not surprising that this [case] is just
the latest in a series of cases in which a supermarket allegedly employed anticompetitive
tactics to keep a competitor out of the market.”).
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challenger’s sole desire is to hamper a prospective competitor’s entry into
the market.10 However, in such a case, it is more likely that the challenge
would be disguised under otherwise legitimate complaints.11 There are two
primary methods in which a challenger can oppose and delay a project:
judicial challenges and administrative challenges.12
Both of these
instruments can be used at many steps along a developer’s path to beginning
its business. Prior to building, developers need zoning variance approvals,
which can be appealed through courts.13 The challengers may oppose the
variance’s approval, for example, on the basis of traffic flow, parking issues,
landscaping compliance, lighting, and infrastructure demands. Developers
may also need building permits, environmental approvals, and other
approvals from local governing bodies, which may also be opposed through
administrative challenges.14 Given the many instances where challengers
can oppose a project, such challenges can accumulate to cause significant
delay.
An entity can sue to challenge a zoning approval, unless the challenge
is brought solely to prevent a competing business from obtaining approval.15
This is the sham exception to the general rule allowing parties to bring forth
lawsuits.16 The sham exception allows the developer to counter-sue the
challenger and potentially receive compensation for lost profits caused by
delays in or dissolution of the development project due to the challenger’s
baseless claims.17 Such spurious challenges brought by a competitor can
impose significant costs on a prospective developer.18 Redevelopment
projects are extensive and costly ventures that may require multiple
appearances before the municipality’s zoning board for variance approvals.
There are costly attorney’s fees for appearing at numerous hearings before
the municipality’s zoning board and for responding to the petitioner’s appeal
of a zoning approval. Further, the developer may be required to create an
extensive site plan, which is “a detailed depiction of the uses, buildings,
10
See, e.g., id. at 168 (noting that Challenger’s ecological consultant “praised itself for
‘manag[ing] to delay the issuance of the [Wetlands] approvals based on a technicality’ and
said that its substantive objections ‘may delay things a bit longer.’”).
11
See, e.g., Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 142
(App. Div. 2017), cert. denied, 231 N.J. 335 (2017).
12
Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.J. 565, 593–94 (1992); see,
e.g., Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 166–70.
13
Myers, supra note 12, at 593–94.
14
Id.
15
See generally, Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49,
60 (1993); Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 182–83.
16
Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60.
17
See generally Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135,
152 (App. Div. 2017).
18
Id.
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utilities, and infrastructure on a particular parcel of land.”19 The site plan
includes all information necessary to explain elements of the project under
review.20 To create the sophisticated site plan, a developer may need to
engage numerous experts, including a planner, architect, engineer, and
environmental expert.21 Challengers guided by an anticompetitive strategy
frequently challenge every part of the development application process,
including variance and permit approvals, in order to avoid the threat of
outside competition.22
Delays to the project can be expensive or even cause the development
project to be terminated.23 Sites targeted for redevelopment may be vacant
while the developer seeks approval. Therefore, any delay to the project
renders the developers unable to collect the rent necessary to offset its
overhead costs. This situation may be fatal if the developer is relying on rent
income to make mortgage payments on the property. Additionally,
significant delays could be destructive to the developer’s project. Since
redevelopment projects are often sensitive to market conditions, delays could
lead to the worsening of a project’s economic condition and make
development no longer financially viable.24 The developer may also lose
prospective tenants to nearby locations if the tenants are unwilling to wait
several years before moving to the newly-developed site.25
Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant26 deals with a prime example of
sham litigation. In Bermant, real estate developers seeking approval for a
shopping center in Hamden, Connecticut claimed that the owners of two
existing shopping centers conspired against the approval of their project.27
In order to delay the approval, the challengers filed “fourteen (mostly
baseless) lawsuits, multiple appeals from adverse decisions, [appeared] at
zoning hearings, [and employed] litigation delaying tactics and [a] massive
publicity campaign . . . .”28 Even if the challenger business-owners lost their
petitions, they believed their challenges could delay the development of the
competing property for a minimum of three to five years.29 One of the
19
Michael C. Spata, Decision-Makers and the Administrative Decisions, HOW TO
LITIGATE A LAND USE CASE: STRATEGIES AND TRIAL TACTICS 55, 99 (Larry J. Smith ed.,
2000).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 60, 99.
22
See generally, Myers, supra note 12, at 593–94.
23
See, e.g., Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 152
(App. Div. 2017).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
664 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981).
27
Id. at 892.
28
Myers, supra note 12, at 594–95 (citing Bermant, 664 F.2d at 89 (2d Cir. 1981)).
29
Bermant, 664 F.2d at 892 (1981).
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owners of the existing shopping centers conceded in a deposition that they
“decided to oppose [the proposal] with every means, to either defeat or delay
[it] for as many years as possible.”30 In Bermant, the Second Circuit held for
the developer, reversing the District of Connecticut’s initial grant of
summary judgment on the sham litigation claim.31 The Second Circuit ruled
that these sham petitions were not protected by the First Amendment and
remanded the case to the district court.32 While this case may seem like an
obvious example of the sham exception, due to the evidence of intended
baseless litigation during the deposition, these occurrences are hardly
uncommon.33 While this type of anticompetitive strategy may at first be
considered extreme, it shows how competitors can use “the courtroom as a
sword to deter entry into a market.”34
It is important for courts to recognize the sham exception in zoning
challenges in order to protect developers from the costly effects of baseless
zoning challenges. However, courts should apply a more flexible standard
when there is sufficient evidence to allege a pattern of baseless claims by the
challenger.
This note is organized as follows: Part I will discuss the NoerrPennington doctrine and the sham litigation exception as it applies to zoning
challenges. Part II will review the factors that courts use to determine
whether the sham litigation exception applies including an analysis of the
Third Circuit Court’s decision in Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill.
Supermarkets, Inc, and the Superior Court of New Jersey’s recent decision
in Main Street at Woolwich, LLC. v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc.35 Part III
will discuss how courts should analyze these decisions and the importance
of finding standing in these types of cases. Part IV will conclude.
II. BACKGROUND: NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE AND SHAM LITIGATION
EXCEPTION AS APPLIED TO ZONING CHALLENGES
This section discusses the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which
establishes the general right to bring a lawsuit in the antitrust context, and
the reasoning behind its application. The doctrine has an important
application to zoning challenges, as the sham exception to the doctrine is
used to combat baseless challenges that are brought to delay the real estate

30

Id.
Id. at 896–98.
32
Id.
33
Myers, supra, note 12, at 594–95.
34
Id.
35
Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir.
2015) Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App. Div.
2017).
31
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development of a competitor.
A. Anticompetitive Behavior is Not Permitted
In general, any business can legally oppose a decision by the zoning
board to grant a site plan approval or challenge the grant of a permit, unless
the challenge is deemed to have no legitimate basis other than to deter the
entry of a competitor into the market.36
The First Amendment gives citizens broad rights “to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”37 The First Amendment protects
the foundation of a representative democracy by giving its citizens the right
to “communicate their desires, anticompetitively motivated or otherwise, to
government officials.”38 However, judicial and administrative challenges
are not protected by antitrust law when a party’s “efforts to influence
government action are considered ‘sham.’”39
Federal antitrust law is primarily established the Sherman Act.40
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits any attempt “to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce.”41 The Clayton Act defines a party eligible to
bring a suit as “any person who [is] injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”42 The broad language of
the Clayton Act demonstrates Congress’s intent to “create a private
enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the
fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the
victims of antitrust violations.”43 In order for the plaintiff’s injury to satisfy
the antitrust requirements of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, they must be a
consumer or competitor in the restrained market.44 Additionally, the Acts
are utilized by “those whose injuries are the means by which the defendants
seek to achieve their anti-competitive ends.”45 In the zoning cases at issue,
real estate developers are the entities that the defendants seek to harm in
order to delay the future competitor-tenant.

36

See generally Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49,
60 (1993); Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 182–83.
37
U.S. CONST. amend I.
38
Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 966 (2003).
39
Id at 966–67.
40
Id. at 966 n.3.
41
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
42
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018).
43
Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 171 (3d Cir.
2015) (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982)).
44
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 172 (quoting W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v.
UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 102 (3d. Cir. 2010)).
45
Id.
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B. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Provides Immunity from Antitrust
Liability for Parties Who Petition the Government
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine limits the Sherman Act’s reach by
relying on First Amendment guarantees.46 The doctrine derives its name
from two United States Supreme Court cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.47 and United Mine Workers of
America v. Pennington.48 Generally, the doctrine establishes that petitioners
for government redress are immune from antitrust liability unless their action
falls under the doctrine’s “sham exception” and deemed objectively
baseless.49 Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a lawsuit is considered
objectively baseless “if no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits.”50 The doctrine provides immunity to petitioners for
redress of their grievances to a variety of government bodies, including
administrative agencies, legislatures, executives, or the judiciary.51 The
doctrine has its foundations in antitrust law, but it has been extended to
support challengers who object to zoning applications, since these challenges
are petitions to government bodies recognized by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.52 “The Noerr-Pennington [d]octrine is not limited to federal
antitrust actions . . . and may be invoked in other actions under state and
federal law to protect the First Amendment right to petition the
government.”53 It has also been applied to protect against “common-law
torts such as malicious prosecution and abuse of process,” which are
frequently the legal basis of claims brought in state courts by developers in
response to the challenger’s objectively baseless opposition of their land
development application.54
However, in Noerr, the Supreme Court recognized that the application
of the Sherman Act is justified in instances where the petition “is a mere
46

Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993).
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
48
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
49
Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60.
50
Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Application of Noerr-Pennington Doctrine by State
Courts, 94 A.L.R. 5th 455, §3 (2018) (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, 974 F. Supp. 2d 927
(N.D. W.Va. 2013)).
51
Id. at §2(a).
52
Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 144 (App.
Div. 2017).
53
Wooster, supra note 50, at §3 (citing Arim v. General Motors Corp., 520 N.W.2d 695
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994)).
54
Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super at 144 (suing for “malicious abuse of process, tortious
interference with prospective business contracts, and civil conspiracy.”); see, e.g., Alfred
Weissman Real Estate, Inc. v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 707 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 2000)
(suing for “(1) tortious interference with a contract, (2) tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage . . . .”).
47
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sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”55 The sham
exception exists to remove protections from meritless claims and ensures
that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not give petitioners an unchecked
right to challenge competitors.56
C. Sham Litigation as an Exception to Noerr-Pennington
The prototypical example of sham litigation “is the filing of frivolous
objections to the license application of a competitor, with no expectation of
achieving denial of the license but simply in order to impose expense and
delay.”57 When the challenger brings a frivolous claim, the presumption of
immunity under the doctrine is nullified, and the party can be held liable
under the exception.58
In the zoning approval context, “[o]bjectors to land use applications are
immune from tort liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine unless ‘the
conduct at issue “is a mere sham to cover . . . an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor.”‘“59 A challenger forfeits its
First Amendment protections when the party’s zoning challenge lacks the
genuine and legitimate purpose needed for a favorable decision.60 Courts
first look at whether the challenger has made one or multiple filings.61 This
is done to determine whether the challenge has a legitimate basis or whether
it is a disguised attempt to directly interfere with the business practices of a
competitor.62
When courts decide whether a petition is a “sham,” a primary
consideration is whether a pattern of baseless claims exists against the
application for an individual development project. In California Motor,63
the Supreme Court discussed how a pattern of sham litigation abuses the
judicial process. Used this way, sham challenges could be effectively
wielded to restrain competition. While one claim may go unnoticed or
receive leniency by a court, “a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may
emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and

55

E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
See generally, Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60–61.
57
Wooster, supra note 50, at §6 (citing Ex parte Simpson, 36 So. 3d 15 (Ala. 2009)).
58
Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
59
Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 144 (citing Fraser v. Bovino, 721 A.2d 20 (N.J. App.
Div. 1998) (quoting Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60–61)).
60
Wooster, supra note 50, at §3 (citing Cordova v. Cline, 396 P.3d 159 (N.M. 2017)).
61
Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162,180 (3d Cir.
2015).
62
Id.
63
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
56
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judicial processes have been abused.”64 While it may be difficult to
determine what actions qualify as baseless or how many of such actions
constitute a pattern, once the court establishes that abuse of the judicial
process has led to an illegal result, it should effectively bar petitioners from
access to the courts and the municipal boards overseeing the zoning
decision.65
When the court determines that the challenges are objectively baseless
and fall under the sham exception, a challenger’s First Amendment right to
petition the government is no longer protected, since the party has sought to
abuse that right for their own gain.66 Further, the Ninth Circuit held that,
“[w]hen dealing with a series of lawsuits, the question is not whether any
one of them has merit . . . but whether they are brought pursuant to a policy
of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose
of injuring a market rival.”67 The challenger’s appeals need to be viewed as
a whole, and one successful challenge does not support numerous baseless
challenges.68
In Hanover Realty, the Third Circuit detailed the distinction between
the standards applied in California Motor and Professional Real Estate.69
Even though these two tests provide similar explanations of the sham
exception, they highlight that sham litigations should be analyzed differently
depending on the number of sham petitions filed by the petitioner with regard
to the subject property of the litigation.70
D. Analysis When There is a Single Sham Petition
When it is alleged that the defendant engaged in a single or limited
number of sham petitions, the two-part test set forth in Professional Real
Estate should be used to determine if the sham litigation exception applies.
“First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”71
Second, challenger’s claims must be brought as “‘an attempt to interfere
64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.; Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
67
USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F. 3d
800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994).
68
Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 73 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that
“[r]epetitive findings, some of which are successful and some unsuccessful, may support an
inference that the process is being misused.”).
69
Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 179–80 (3d Cir.
2015).
70
Id. at 179 (stating “[t]hree other Courts of Appeals have reconciled California Motor
and Professional Real Estate by concluding that they apply in different situations: California
Motors to a series of sham petitions and Professional Real Estate to a single sham petition.”).
71
Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60.
65
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directly with the business relationships of a competitor,’ through the ‘use of
the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as
an anticompetitive weapon.’”72 This test should apply when there is
evidence of sham litigation regarding a single suit or legal appeal by the
challenging party.73 Part two of the test can otherwise be stated that the
applicant is “subjectively motivated by bad faith.”74 Further, “[i]f an
objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to
elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr.”75 Only after
the challenged litigation is determined to be objectively meritless will the
court receive the litigant’s subjective motivation under the second prong.76
Because there is only a single or limited number of challenges, the courts are
less suspicious of the challenge than if there is evidence of numerous filings,
which often indicates sham litigation. Courts have reasoned that “with only
one ‘data point’ it is difficult to determine with any precision whether the
petition was anticompetitive.”77 It is also possible that courts have been
unwilling to limit First Amendment protections on the basis of a single suit
filed against a developer.
E. Analysis When There is a Series of Sham Petitions
The standard in California Motor should apply in cases where the
defendant files numerous challenges or legal proceedings with regard to the
prospective development project.78 There is no required number of petitions
needed to apply the California Motor analysis rather than the Professional
Real Estate test.79 The Supreme Court in California Motor held that a
complaint sufficiently alleged a sham litigation when the aggrieved party
established that the challengers “sought to bar their competitors from
meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process.”80 Additionally, the affected party alleged that the
“petitioners instituted the proceedings and actions with or without probable
cause, and regardless of the merits of the case.”81 The Ninth Circuit

72
Id. (quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 380
(1991); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127–144
(1961)).
73
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 179–80.
74
Wooster, supra note 50, at §3 (citing ACI Worldwide Corp. v. Baldwin Hackett &
Meeks, Inc., 896 N.W. 2d 156 (Neb. 2017)).
75
Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60.
76
Id. at 60–61.
77
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 180.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 180–81.
80
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972).
81
Id.
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discussed that California Motor in USS-POSCO Industries, and “recognized
that the filing of a whole series of lawsuits and other legal actions without
regard to the merits has far more serious implications than filing a single
action.”82 This standard triggers a holistic review weighing the facts of the
case, in comparison to the two-part test in Professional Real Estate, where
the court is less likely to scrutinize the single challenge.83
When reviewing cases where a challenger has brought multiple
lawsuits or attempts to delay the developer’s project, “the question is not
whether any one of them has merit . . . but whether they are brought pursuant
to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for
the purpose of injuring a market rival.”84 The review is prospective and
considers whether the numerous filings were intended to harass the
developer.85 In order to determine if the filings were without merit, the court
must look at all the facts and circumstances of the case.86 The court “should
perform a holistic review that may include looking at the defendant’s filing
status (i.e., win-loss percentage) as circumstantial evidence of the
defendant’s subjective motivations.”87 Included in these considerations
should be evidence of bad faith, as well as the magnitude and nature of the
harm caused by the challenger’s petitioning activity.88 The court must weigh
the wins and losses for each side since the challenger may succeed on some
proceedings simply as a matter of chance.89 In other words, “[t]he fact that
there may be moments of merit within a series of lawsuits is not inconsistent
with a campaign of sham litigation.”90
The sham exception is considerably narrow.91 The exception
frequently involves complicated questions of fact and places the burden of
proof on the party “opposing [the] application of the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine to prove that the [challenger] comes within the sham exception.”92
The analysis is further complicated by the fact that more is needed to prove
sham litigation than anticompetitive intent.93
82

USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F. 3d
800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994).
83
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 180–81.
84
Id. at 180.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 180–81
88
Id. at 181.
89
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 180.
90
Id. at 182 (quoting Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union Local 27, 728 F.3d 354, 363–64 (4th Cir. 2013)).
91
Wooster, supra note 50, at §6 (citing United States v. Brown, F. Supp. 3d 697 (N.D.
Ohio 2016)).
92
Wooster, supra note 50, at §6 (Brown, F. Supp. 3d 697).
93
Alfred Weissman Real Estate, Inc. v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 707 N.Y.S.2d 647,
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III. APPLYING THE STANDARD IN RECENT DECISIONS
Part II will discuss the Third Circuit’s analysis in Hanover 3201 Realty,
LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc. and review how the Superior Court of New
Jerseywithin the state court systemapplied the Third Circuit’s reasoning
in Main St. at Woolwich, LLC v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc.
A. Third Circuit’s Analysis in the Hanover Realty
In Hanover Realty, a developer sought zoning approval to improve its
property by constructing a commercial building that would become a
Wegmans supermarket.94 The owner of a nearby ShopRite supermarket filed
numerous administrative and legal challenges to the developer’s permit
applications.95 In response, the developer sued the challenger, the ShopRite
group, alleging violations of the Sherman Act and arguing that the
petitioner’s filings were baseless attempts to keep out a potential market
competitor.96
Cases like Hanover Realty are complicated because the challenger’s
actions impact the developer, who is not necessarily a direct competitor. The
challenger is typically a supermarket ownership group that owns numerous
supermarkets, whereas the aggrieved party is a real estate developer.97 The
prospective tenant at the newly developed location—in this case
Wegmans—may not want to be involved in the sham litigation lawsuit.98
Therefore, some anticompetitive claims do not survive the question of
standing.99 In Hanover Realty, the Third Circuit held that Hanover Realty
did not have standing to bring a “claim for the attempted monopolization of
the market for rental space” because Hanover Realty itself does not compete

652 (App. Div. 2000) (stating “[c]itizens who petition for governmental action favorable to
them cannot be prosecuted under the antitrust laws, even though their petitions are motivated
by anticompetitive intent.”).
94
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 167; Company Overview, WEGMANS,
https://www.wegmans.com/about-us/company-overview.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2018)
(explaining that Wegmans is a supermarket chain based in the Northeast with ninety-eight
locations in Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts).
95
Hanover
Realty,
806
F.3d
at
167;
About
Us,
SHOPRITE,
https://shop.shoprite.com/globaldata/banner-pages/about-us (last visited Dec. 20, 2018)
(detailing that ShopRite is a cooperative with fifty members “who individually own and
operate under the ShopRite banner.” The company has locations throughout the Northeast in
Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut).
96
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 164.
97
Id. at 167 (stating that the defendants owned twenty-six Shop Rites in New Jersey
including one in Hanover about two miles from the site of the proposed Wegmans).
98
Id.
99
See, e.g., Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 187 (Ambro, J., dissenting in part) (citing
Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983); Serfecz v. Jewel
Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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with ShopRite in that market.100 However, this did not eliminate the
possibility that the developer could seek legal action against ShopRite for
anticompetitive behavior altogether. The court stated that “[t]he end goal of
[ShopRite’s] alleged anticompetitive conduct was to injure Wegmans, a
prospective competitor.”101 In order to indirectly keep Wegmans from
operating a competing business just two miles from their ShopRite location,
the challengers sought to impose costs on the developer of the property, and
not directly on Wegmans.102 The challengers proceeded in this manner
because the developer was the party who needed to obtain the appropriate
approvals and permits before beginning construction of the new
development.103 “[I]njuring Hanover Realty was the very means by which
Defendants could get to Wegmans” and thus ShopRite tried to remove
themselves from liability on a technicality.104 Therefore, “Hanover Realty
can establish that its injury was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with Defendants’
anticompetitive conduct,” and thus they have standing to sue the
defendants.105
After realizing that Wegmans would be leasing commercial space at the
proposed development site and entering their market, ShopRite filed
numerous administrative and court challenges to Hanover Realty’s
applications.106 This “petitioning campaign was designed to block Hanover
Realty from obtaining the permits and approvals it needed to proceed with
the project.”107
The challengers disputed the Hanover Realty project in four major
phases.108 First, they sought to vacate a Flood Hazard Area Permit already
granted to Hanover Realty.109 However, their appeal was dismissed because
their claims of “general property rights” and the new development causing
“greater competition” were not sufficient to prove that the challengers were
an aggrieved party.110 Second, the challengers hired an ecological consultant
to submit a letter on their behalf, opposing the various wetlands permits
granted by the New Jersey Environmental Department.111 The developer
uncovered an email from the challenger’s ecological consulting firm, which
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 167.
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 166–67.
Id. at 166.
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 167.
Id. at 166–70.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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claimed it was proud of its ability to “delay the issuance of the Wetlands
approvals based on a technicality,” and the fact that its additional objections
may be able to further delay the project.112 Ultimately, the Environmental
Department issued the Wetlands permit, but with several conditions,
including one requiring the developers to survey the property for the
presence of Indiana bats prior to construction, a condition with which the
developers ultimately had to comply.113
Third, the challengers submitted a letter to the Department of
Transportation (“DOT”) objecting to Hanover Realty’s application for a
street permit, which contained road improvement conditions in the
development agreement.114 The DOT stated that Hanover Realty would need
to perform additional improvements after it considered all relevant data and
arguments submitted by third parties.115 The challengers’ final formal
objection came in the form of an action brought before New Jersey State
Court, which sought to nullify the Zoning Board’s site plan approval.116 The
New Jersey State Court dismissed the challengers’ claim, both on the
standing issue and the merits of the case.117 This objection was perhaps the
most telling piece evidence establishing challengers’ bad faith. The
challenger did not have any objections to Hanover Realty’s application to
rezone the property for retail use until after the Zoning Board approved the
site plan.118 After the zoning board approval, the challenger likely knew that
a Wegmans’ supermarket would be occupying the new retail development,
spurring him to lodge the challenge with the court.
The time-sensitive nature of these approvals is shown by the fact that
the development contract between Hanover Realty and their prospective
tenant, Wegmans, included a provision that, in the event “Hanover Realty
was unable to secure the required permits within two years of the agreement,
Wegmans could walk away from the deal.”119
The Third Circuit reconciled California Motor and Professional Real
Estate “by concluding that they apply to different situations: California
Motor [applies] to a series of sham petitions and Professional Real Estate

112

Id. at 168.
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 168 (asserting that Hanover Realty conducted the Indiana
bat survey and reported that no bats were found. Additionally, “Indiana bats may be found
over a broad swath of the United States, including New Jersey. But true to name, half of this
bat population does, in fact, hibernate in Indiana.”).
114
Id. at 169.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 170.
118
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 169.
119
Id. at 167.
113
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[applies] to a single sham petition.”120 Here, since the ShopRite group filed
four challenges with numerous sub-challenges against the developer, the
more holistic and scrutinized review under California Motor should apply.121
Hanover Realty can establish that the ShopRite group filed a pattern of
objectively baseless judicial and administrative challenges to the developer’s
project.122 Even though the challenger succeeded on parts of their challenges
before the Environmental Department and DOT, “the fact that there may be
moments of merit within a series of lawsuits is not inconsistent with a
campaign of sham litigation.”123 Further, the court looked at the subjective
intent of the challengers and stated that they have not “articulated any
genuine interest in flooding or traffic near the proposed Wegmans (which is
two miles [away] from [the] ShopRite), or in protecting the Indiana bat.”124
Therefore, there are sufficient facts to conclude that the ShopRite group may
have engaged in a pattern of sham litigation and would thus not be entitled
to protection under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.125 The court did not
discuss potential damages, but Hanover’s brief to the district court listed its
damages as “lost rent, increased expenses and carrying changes and
diminution of value resulting from [ShopRite’s] sham petitioning.”126
It is also important to address the dissent in this case, due to the
difficulty of establishing standing in such cases. The dissent believed that
Hanover Realty was not the victim of an antitrust violation because the
company does not compete in the supermarket business with ShopRite.127
As the dissent noted, Hanover supplied commercial space to full-service
supermarkets, however, the court ultimately ruled that it was the market for
grocery stores, rather than the real property market, that was allegedly
restrained.128
B. Standard as Applied in Woolwich
In Main Street at Woolwich, LLC. v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., a
developer planned to improve its land in Woolwich Township by building a

120

Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
122
Id. at 182–83.
123
Id. at 182 (quoting Waugh Chapel S. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union
Local 27, 728 F.3d 354, 365 (4th Cir. 2013)).
124
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 182.
125
Id. at 182–183.
126
Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v.
Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 179 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1327), 2014 U.S. Dist. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 1472, at *39.
127
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 186 (Ambro, J., dissenting in part).
128
Id.
121
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shopping center.129 In 2007, the developer, Woolwich, began the process of
obtaining government approval to develop the site, which required the assent
of the New Jersey State Planning Committee and numerous authorizations
from the Woolwich Township Joint Land Use Board.130 In 2010, the
Woolwich Township Joint Land Use Board (“Board”) approved the
developer’s general development plan (“GDP”), which permitted the
development of 1.5 million square feet of commercial and retail space in
three phases.131 At the time the was GDP approved, it was unknown which
stores would occupy the proposed development site.132 In April 2012, the
developer submitted an application for site plan approval to develop phase
one of the project, which included the building of a Wal-Mart.133 In October
2013, the Board approved the developer’s final site plan, which went
unopposed.134
Following the Board’s approval of the site plan, an owner of a nearby
ShopRite challenged the approval for “improper change of the phasing dates
of the Complex, inadequate water and sewer resources, improper addition of
acreage to the parcel, violations of the Municipal Land Use Law
(“MLUL”) . . . inadequate proof to support the variances and waivers, [and]
failure to comply with notice requirements.”135 However, the challengers
lost these zoning petitions, and the developers filed a complaint against the
challengers, alleging malicious abuse of process, tortious interference, and
civil conspiracy.136 The developers claimed that the challengers’ filings
amounted to sham litigation because they were filed with the sole intention
of interfering with approval for a prospective competitor.137
The New Jersey Superior Court held that there were sufficient facts
alleged to find that Shop Rite “engaged in sham litigation for the sole
purpose of impeding the development of plaintiffs’ shopping center and to
stifle competition.”138 The court adopted the holding of Hanover Realty,
concluding that “[t]he motion judge was required to consider the allegations
in the plaintiff’s complaint that the [challengers’] action was part of a pattern
of sham litigation brought by defendants for the purpose of injuring market

129
Main St. Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 142 (App.
Div. 2017), cert. denied, 231 N.J. 335 (2017).
130
Id. at 141–42.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 142.
133
Id. at 142.
134
Id.
135
Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super at 142.
136
Id. at 140, 143.
137
Id. at 140.
138
Id. at 141.
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rivals rather than to redress actual grievances.”139
Under the California Motor standard, the court first reviewed the
number of the challengers’ claims that were baseless and repetitive.140 The
court did not find support for the challengers’ original appeals, raising
concerns about the validity of the Woolwich GDP ordinance.141 Further, the
court found the challengers’ appeal of the Board’s determination was
without merit and their challenge to the water and sewer issues was “not
supported by the MLUL or the case law.”142 Accordingly, the developer had
successfully defended against litigation brought by the defendants.143 In
addition to challenging the development project at issue, the developer
alleged that between the challengers themselves and their associated entity,
Wakefern, the parties had “engaged in an extensive course of conduct,
including sham litigation, to interfere with the development of supermarkets
that would compete with ShopRite stores.”144 The developer’s allegation
included a list of seventeen sites in which they claim the challengers and
Wakefern had attempted to interfere.145 The list contained challenges to
projects across New Jersey for prospective sites for supermarkets like WalMart, Stop & Shop, Aldi, Kings, and Wegmans Supermarkets.146 The court
included these challenges of other sites in their analysis, along with multiple
petitions against the subject property.147
As the court noted in Hanover Realty, a holistic review including all
the facts and circumstances surrounding the challenge should be
performed.148 Therefore, in Woolwich, it may be relevant that there is
specific evidence of anticompetitive behavior between the challengers and
developer. The court noted that, while the challengers’ appeal was pending,
the developer alleged that someone with a connection to the challengers
called the developer’s representatives and “inquired whether plaintiffs would
be willing to lease space at the [proposed] complex to the [challengers].”149
If these allegations are true, it would provide additional evidence of
anticompetitive behavior beyond the zoning appeals themselves.
139

Id.
Id. at 145.
141
Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super at 149.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 150.
144
Id. at 147; About Us, SHOPRITE, http://www.shoprite.com/about-us/ (last visited Dec.
20, 2018) (conveying that Wakefern is “the merchandising and distribution arm for
ShopRite.” It is a retailer-owned cooperative owned by the approximately fifty owners of the
individual ShopRite stores).
145
Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 147–48.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 143.
148
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 180.
149
Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 143.
140
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Applying the appropriate standard is especially important in light of the
lower court’s ruling that the challengers’ actions to petition against “the GDP
[were] protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and [were] not
objectively baseless.”150 The New Jersey Superior Court noted that the
motion judge misapplied the standard and provided no support for her
conclusion that the challengers’ actions were not objectively baseless.151
The developer brought the anticompetitive allegations of malicious
abuse of process, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy after it
successfully defended against the litigation brought by the challengers.152
Unlike in Hanover Realty, the developer did not bring the case in federal
court based on antitrust claims, but instead brought the case in state court
with allegations of these common law tort violations.153 However, the NoerrPennington doctrine also applies to common law tort claims brought in state
court.154 The court noted the Fourth Circuit’s application of California
Motor in Waugh Chapel South, LLC. v. United Foods & Commercial
Workers Union Local 27.155 In this case, the Fourth Circuit held that “the
subjective motive of the litigant and objective merits of the suit are relevant,
but other signs of bad-faith litigation . . . may also be probative of abuse of
the adjudicatory process.”156 In Waugh Chapel South, the court found sham
litigation “where only one of fourteen proceedings were successful.”157
C. Malicious Abuse of Process
Malicious abuse of process is “[t]he improper and tortious use of a
legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or
beyond the process’s scope.”158 The developer must show that the challenger
“performed further acts after the issuance of process which represents the
perversion or abuse of the legitimate purposes of that process.”159
In Woolwich, the developer argued that filing an appeal of the
developer’s approval and subsequently reaching out to a representative of
the developer to lease the proposed space may be a sufficient “further act

150

Id. at 140.
Id. at 140–41.
152
Id.
153
Compare Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 170, with Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 143.
154
Wooster, supra note 50 at §3 (citing Alfred Weissman Real Estate, Inc. v. Big V
Supermarkets, Inc., 707 N.Y.S. 2d 647 (App. Div. 2000).
155
Waugh Chapel S. LLC v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 27, 728
F.3d 354, 364 (4th Cir. 2013).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Abuse of Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
159
Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 151.
151

LANYON (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

1/16/2019 11:09 AM

SHAM LITIGATION IN ZONING CHALLENGES

153

after the issuance of process.”160 Additionally, the challengers did not
oppose the zoning approval until they discovered that a ShopRite competitor
would have been a tenant at the site.161 These two arguments undermined
the challengers’ claim that they opposed the development “in good faith.”162
D. Tortious Interference
Tortious interference claims must “rest on facts plausibly supporting a
conclusion that defendants’ actions were ‘improper’ or ‘wrongful.’”163 In
order to determine if either of these conditions are met, the court must
evaluate “the nature of and motivation behind the conduct, the interests
advanced and interfered with, societal interests that bear on the rights of each
party, the proximate relationship between the conduct and interference, and
the relationship between the parties.”164 Here, in Woolwich, the court again
looked at the timing of the challenges and noted that no appeals followed the
original GDP approval.165 However, when it was later discovered that a WalMart would be occupying the commercial space, the challengers hired a
lawyer in order to appeal the second GDP approval.166
This case—whose litigation ran for two and a half years—is another
example of how zoning petitions can be an effective tool against a competitor
if left unchecked.167 The developers stated that during the pending litigation
“they were unable to proceed with the development of [the property], could
not enter into leases with prospective tenants, and lost ‘credibility in the
marketplace.’”168
There is a delicate balance between enacting stricter laws to stop
anticompetitive zoning challenges and infringing on the First Amendment
right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Using a factsensitive, open-ended analysis allowed the Woolwich court to review the fact
that the challengers had filed numerous similar anticompetitive petitions
across New Jersey.

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 152 (quoting Nostrame v. Santiago, 213 N.J. 109, 123 (2013)).
Id. at 152 (quoting Nostrame, 213 N.J. at 122).
Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 151.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 152.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A. Appropriate Analysis for Reviewing Sham Litigation in Zoning
In Hanover Realty, the Third Circuit reconciled California Motor and
Professional Real Estate “by concluding that they apply to different
situations: California Motor [applies] to a series of sham petitions[,] and
Professional Real Estate [applies] to a single sham petition.”169 First, the
court should determine (1) how many filings the challenging party has issued
against the prospective development, or (2) whether the challengers have
filed numerous meritless filings.170 “Where there is only one alleged sham
petition, Professional Real Estate’s exacting two-step test properly [tilts the
scale] in favor of the defendant.”171 Courts should be wary of limiting First
Amendment freedom of speech protections when there is only one petition.
Additionally, “with only one ‘data point,’ it is difficult to determine with any
precision whether the petition was anticompetitive.”172 However, when it is
sufficiently alleged that the defendant interfered by filing a pattern of
baseless appeals against the developer’s project, the more flexible
application in California Motor should apply.173 In this case, a court “should
perform a holistic review that may include looking at the defendant’s filing
status (i.e. win-loss percentage) as well as circumstantial evidence of the
defendant’s subjective motivations.”174 “Courts should consider evidence of
bad-faith as well as the magnitude and the nature of the collateral harm
imposed on the plaintiffs by the defendants’ petitioning activity (i.e. abuses
of the discovery process and interference with access to governmental
agencies).”175 Courts must also be careful not to let a defendant’s campaign
of sham litigation be overlooked just because they have been successful in a
limited number of challenges.176
Further, in Woolwich, the New Jersey Superior Court highlighted
evidence provided by the developer that the challenging party had conducted
the same or similar anticompetitive actions in other projects.177 When
determining if the challenger has engaged in a pattern of baseless claims, it
may be relevant to include the challengers’ alleged sham litigations in other
locations and not only the number of challenges filed in the case at issue.
169

Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 179.
Id. at 180.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 180–81 (stating “a more flexible standard is appropriate when dealing with a
pattern of petitioning”).
174
Id. at 180.
175
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d 162 at 181.
176
Id. at 182.
177
Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. 135 at 147–48.
170
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B. Standing Requirement
A just result is not always achieved where an aggrieved party is made
whole with a counter-suit because a developer may be shut out of court for
lack of standing. As the dissent in Hanover Realty discusses, standing often
keeps the developers from suing the parties who opposed numerous permits
and presented court challenges delaying their development project.178 There
is irony in the fact that a party that weathered allegedly baseless judicial and
administrative challenges is then prevented from appealing to the courts to
make themselves whole for lost profits from the failed development project.
It is problematic that the developer lost the development project due to the
expenses and delay imposed on the project by the challenger, so the
developer should have a cause of action.
The standing question is raised for cases in federal court because
obtaining standing for an antitrust claim requires that the party be “injured
in his business or property by anything forbidden in antitrust laws.”179 In
Hanover Realty, the court ruled that the developer had standing to sue
because its actions were “inextricably intertwined” with the challengers’
objectively baseless conduct intended to prohibit access by the prospective
tenant.180 Defendants may look to bring an antitrust case in federal court
because they are able to receive treble damages and reimbursement for the
lawsuit’s costs, including attorney’s fees.181 However, if antitrust standing
cannot be established in federal court, an alternative is to bring causes of
action for tortious interference and malicious abuse of process in state
courts.182
To combat sham challenges that lead to unfair outcomes for developers
and overwhelm the court dockets with baseless claims, the more flexible
standard outlined in Hanover Realty should be applied when there is
sufficient evidence to allege a pattern of baseless claims by the challenger.

178

Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 187 (Ambro, J., dissenting in part) (citing Southaven Land
Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983); Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67
F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995)).
179
15 U.S.C. § 15(a); see also, Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982)
(“The Clayton Act (Act) does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to
competitors, or to sellers. The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all
who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.”).
180
Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d 162 at 168.
181
15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
182
See e.g., Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super. at 153.

